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Geomedia and privacy in context.  
Paradoxical behavior or the unwitting sharing  
of geodata with digital platforms?
Abstract. The increasing pervasiveness of media in society implies the ubiquitous processes of geoda-
ta-capture and real-time feedback. The concept of Geomedia considers these developments and raises 
the questions of geoprivacy and corporate surveillance. The aim of this study was to investigate what 
kinds of geolocation data are shared wittingly or unwittingly, and in what contexts. Beyond that, we 
ask how much individuals know about the data-sharing processes and the underlying commercial logic, 
and how they act upon this knowledge (whether paradoxically or not). Our study was theoretically 
framed by contextual privacy (Nissenbaum 2011), because we assumed that a violation of privacy is 
perceived differently according to the context. The quasi-experimental design (using a WiFi-capture 
device) combined with a questionnaire revealed the participants’ attitudes to, and awareness of, data 
sharing, and their understanding of geoprivacy and geomedia use. The main results show that people 
are aware of the underlying commercial logic, have privacy concerns and, strongly depending on 
contextual factors, their knowledge and capabilities, act upon this awareness. Finally, we show that 
smartphones covertly share a huge amount of meta and trafic data.
Keywords: privacy, geoprivacy, geomedia, privacy paradox, permanent spatial connectivity, ubiquitous 
geodata capturing, corporate surveillance, awareness
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Introduction
Privacy concerns about online third-party tracking and monitoring as well as 
digital network behavior have received much attention in recent years due to the 
ubiquitous use of smartphones, the rise of the so-called “Big Five” (Google, Ama-
zon, Microsot, Facebook, and Apple – large platforms that permanently collect and 
monetize user data), and ongoing discussions about political and legal regulation 
strategies in the light of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Among the 
whole range of collected sensor and usage data, geolocation is of particular interest 
as it reveals spatio-relational and spatio-temporal information about individuals 
(Wilken 2018). Location has gained importance across diferent disciplines and in-
dustries, and has become core to many business processes. Tech companies derive 
added value by combining, in unprecedented ways, the collection, aggregation, il-
tering and re-organization of networked personal data with geolocational data for 
even more precisely targeted marketing strategies and predictions, such as content 
customization and delivery (Estes 2016). In formulating new critical perspectives, 
including potential advantages and risks, several scholars use the term “geomedia” 
(Fast et al. 2018; McQuire 2016) to articulate the new societal conditions that arise 
through ubiquitous geodata capture, emphasizing the huge importance of media in 
the 21st century. Geomedia are indicative of dichotomies that appear to be inherent 
in internet technologies as a whole: they can be the “media of surveillance and 
control, of intrusion into intimacy” (Jekel et al. 2014, p. ix), media that inluence 
political decision making and voting behavior, and the media of empowerment, 
democratization and engagement.
Given the omnipresent and widespread use of geomedia, we have to pose questions 
about their possible impacts on individuals and society, against the background of the 
shit from surveillance and intrusion into privacy exclusively realized by states and 
governments in the past to now the same by companies. his shit forms part of the 
economics of advanced capitalism (Murdock 2017), a driving force for technological 
development that shapes the possibilities of data-sharing. In this study, we focus on 
usage, privacy concerns and privacy management related to geolocational data at the 
level of the individual user, endeavoring to discover what types of geolocation data 
they unwittingly or deliberately share, and in what contexts. How much do individ-
uals know about the data-sharing processes and the underlying commercial logic, 
and how do they act upon this knowledge? Although privacy concerns, behavior and 
attitudes are discussed widely in various disciplines, we are not aware of any study 
that evaluates the speciic roles of geolocation and geomedia from a media and com-
munication studies perspective. To theoretically frame the complex conditions under 
which people share or do not share data, we refer to Nissenbaum’s contextual privacy 
approach (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 147), as she dismisses the public/private dichotomy 
and interprets privacy in relation to an appropriate low of personal information (Nis-
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senbaum 2010). Based on a combination of a questionnaire and a quasi-experimental 
setup, we show people’s ideas about (locational) privacy in contrast to the data they 
actually, (un)wittingly, share by mobile device.
Living in Geomedia
he concept of mediatization is used to characterize media as one of the forces 
contributing to the constitution of societies nowadays. Mediatization is described as 
a “metaprocess” (Krotz 2007, 2017), from an institutional perspective (Altheide, Snow 
1979; Hjarvard 2008, 2013), or as part of a social-constructivist tradition that recently 
introduced the term “deep mediatization” (Couldry, Hepp 2017; Hepp 2017). hese 
approaches share the fact that they indicate that “modernity encompasses social and 
cultural changes in which more and more areas and forms of practice become saturated 
with and adapted to media technologies and institutions” (Jansson 2018, p. 2)1. Media 
(especially mass media) have always played an important role in structuring the fabric 
of society and public discourses. Currently, we have reached a point where ubiquitous 
smartphone use, dataication and artiicial intelligence (especially machine learning al-
gorithms) have penetrated people’s inal decision-making and action processes. Classical 
causal-linear models of mass communication no longer apply to these phenomena, and 
media and communication science theories that diferentiated between producer/con-
sumer, channel/content, interpersonal/mediated communication, real world/cyberspace, 
private/public no longer seem to it, as these binary oppositions become blurred. An 
“almost complete mediatization of society seems a somewhat self-evident observation” 
(Deuze 2012, p. x), meaning that we do not live with, but in media. “Media are to us as 
water is to ish. his does not mean life is determined by media – it just suggests that 
whether we like it or not, every aspect of our lives takes place in media” (ibid.). For 
this reason, we suggest adhering to Deuze’s deinition of media, which captures them 
interchangeably as “information and communication technologies” and as “machines”; 
”[media] thus broadly conceived are any (symbolic or technological) systems that enable, 
structure or amplify communication between people” (Deuze 2012, p. xii). he shit from 
living with to living in media has some far-reaching consequences: media have become 
a necessary and unavoidable part of our lives; they are ubiquitous, pervasive (they can-
not be switched of) and indeterminate (not inished or static); they act as platforms for 
communication to constitute and reproduce the world we live in (Deuze 2012, p. xi).
One aspect that made this densiication of media possible is the “birth” of loca-
tion-aware mobile devices. As they incorporate time and locational accuracy, they set 
the stage not only for a broad range of new applications but also for a whole range of new 
1 An extensive discussion of diferent approaches to mediatisation cannot be given here due to the 
focus on results.
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possibilities for interaction. “he integration of the one-way GPS signal transmission 
into a two-way mobile communication system” (Abernathy 2017, p. 24) seems a small 
technological advance, but in fact it heralds a new era of mapping, connectivity, naviga-
tion, seeking of friends in places nearby, “checking in”, observation and communication. 
Location-awareness has iniltrated a broad range of sectors and industries (healthcare, 
automobile, transport, education, banking, entertainment, tourism, government, etc.), 
and according to Wilken (2018) we now experience the seamless integration (if one 
unintended by users) of location with services, and (social) networks. his “ubiquitous 
geodata capture” (Wilken 2018, p. 26) marks the “third generation” (ibid.) of geodata 
services and platforms, where location has become vital for operation and service at all 
levels. his analysis not only applies to “native” third-generation services (like Uber), but 
also to established search and social media companies (such as Google and Facebook) 
that have efectively become “third-generation” location-based service platforms, insofar 
as they have reshaped their operations by ubiquitous geodata capture (Wilken 2018, 
p. 26). hese services and platforms capture and circulate “geodata at a scale, speed 
and level of complexity that is markedly diferent from earlier incarnations of similar 
services” (Wilken 2018, p. 29).
In addressing these new conditions, several scholars introduced the term “geome-
dia” (Fast et al. 2018; McQuire 2016), which takes into consideration technological2 
and social change, critically addressing this permanent spatial connectivity.3 Follow-
ing a broader deinition, geomedia "includes all representations of space, covering 
a wide range of outputs from verbal description to visualization. Both theoretical 
and empirical work suggests that media in general and geomedia in particular set the 
stage for the appropriation of space by contextualizing communication" (Gryl, Jekel 
2012, p. 22). In his critical analysis, Lapenta (2011) argues that geomedia "regulate 
social behaviour and interpersonal communications, coordinate social interactions 
and organise the production and exchange of the founding immaterial commodities 
constitutive of these immaterial spaces" (Lapenta 2011, p. 22).
As Lapenta refers only to the technological aspects of geomedia, McQuire (2016) 
develops a much broader understanding of geomedia, placing far greater empha-
sis on urban conditions and including social change. "Geomedia is a concept that 
crystallizes at the intersection of four related trajectories: convergence, ubiquity, 
location-awareness and real-time feedback" (McQuire 2016, p. 2). Ubiquity refers 
to the omnipresence of mobile, embedded and connected media devices, available 
anywhere, anytime, even on the move; these devices converge increasingly with each 
other through the fusion of technologies, genres and institutions. Location-awareness 
2 Referring to a certain set of technological conditions. For details of this technological aspect, see 
Ricker (2017).
3 "permanent connectivity" is used by Steinmaurer (2014) to describe a new type of communication 
(dispositive), deined by a new status of individual integration into the technological infrastruc-
tures of digital networks.
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means that information is adapted to the user’s location and mobility, while real-time 
feedback refers to the many-to-many lows of (locational) information in which the 
time between an event and its media presence is shrunk almost to zero, “supporting 
novel experiences of social simultaneity” (McQuire 2016, p. 4).
he possible implications of geomedia range from potential empowerment, activ-
ism (for example “smart mobs” (Rheingold 2002) and civic engagement (Gryl, Jekel 
2012; Gryl, Jekel, Donert 2010; Haklay 2017) to intrusion into privacy and surveil-
lance (Klauser, Widmer 2017; Leszczynski 2017; Murakami Wood 2017). If we want 
to analyze the impacts and importance of these “third-generation data-driven social, 
search, and analytics platforms” (Wilken 2018, p. 35) and formulate new critical per-
spectives, then the concept of geomedia, as presented in this chapter, can be seen as 
a “robust and productive framework” (ibid.)!
Geomedia and corporate surveillance
Geolocation has become not only an integral part of everyday smartphone experi-
ence and of changing appropriations and perceptions of space (hielmann et al. 2012), 
but also “a necessary part of the technological developments and the corporate arrange-
ments that underpin them (business deals, monetization strategies, platform-speciic 
data extraction methods, algorithmic sorting, etc.)” (Wilken 2018, p. 21). he need to 
take into consideration these economic and socio-technical transformation processes 
underlines the necessity for academic debates on geomedia usage, behavioral patterns 
and privacy management. Geomedia structure communication spatially, but oten in an 
unpredicted way, or in one that is unforeseeable and invisible to the user. Besides police 
and secret service work, it is applied most oten in a commercial context. For example, 
pausing in front of a shoe-shop window, say, with your location-enabled smartphone in 
your pocket, without even actively using the phone, could reveal things of commercial 
interest to the Big Five (or others), even if you have never actively searched for shoes 
on shopping platforms.
he rising interest in geocoded data and their use in the mainstream market is 
relected in the growth of the geospatial industry, which is projected to increase by 
a further 13.6% by the year 2020 (Geospatial Media and Communications 2018, p. 4). 
Using geocoded data is proitable for businesses in two ways: selling the geocoded 
data and creating new services out of the data to collect even more geocoded data. 
his has led to a change in the geoinformation market from one of corporate clients 
to a demand-driven mass market (Fischer 2010, p. 30). It is not only the world’s 
leading sotware producer for GIS, Esri,4 that stands to beneit from location intelli- 
4 Whitepaper on how to use location intelligence to maximize the Value of BI: https://www.esri.
com/~/media/iles/pdfs/library/whitepapers/pdfs/using-location-intelligence.pdf
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gence;5 even the core areas of popular internet use, dominated by “the Big Five” 
“Google in search; Facebook in social media; Amazon in online retailing; and Apple 
and Microsot in personal computing;” (Murdock 2017, p. 123) are being reshaped by 
ubiquitous geodata capture. hey “are at the heart of the emerging general economy 
of advanced capitalism” (Murdock 2017, p. 123), and collecting and trading users’ 
personal data is the core of their business model. Murdock (2017, p. 130) suggests 
that one should analyze the dynamics of “deep capitalism” rather than those of “deep 
mediatization”. hese processes widely determine our everyday habits within the 
framework of mobile-network-technologies through (machine learning) algorithms 
and make corporate surveillance more precise. On an individual level, “new per-
formances of self and re-inscriptions of the body in place and space” (Schwartz, 
Halegoua 2014, p. 1656), called the “spatial self ” (Schwartz & Halegoua, 2014) arise; 
so too do new forms of identity-management (Saker 2016), self-surveillance, com-
petition with others, and “watching one another”, called “lateral surveillance”; (An-
drejevic 2005). Individuals “[look] at [their] own content through other people’s 
eyes” – social surveillance (Marwick, 2012), or “[control] one another” – interveil-
lance (Jansson 2015), deined as the “social embeddedness of contemporary surveil-
lance processes, typically governed by commercial forces, while at the same time 
recognizing the non-hierarchical and non-systematic nature of most social mon-
itoring processes occurring in everyday life” (Christensen, Jansson, 2015; Jansson 
2015, p. 81).
We assume that big platforms derive beneits from these developments in three 
ways: (1) information is collected regarding individual preferences, location and 
behavior, and (2) can be connected to individual networks of the (control-)rela-
tionships that emerge from interveillance; and (3) the collected data can be merged 
with data for virtual groups worldwide (i.e. groups of people with similar proiles). 
Subjects and their social and spatial behavior become controllable and predictable. 
Geomedia can therefore be seen as “progressing” as a close web of surveillance. 
Corporate surveillance is no longer just about targeted marketing. Furthermore, 
the creation of ever-more precise virtual groups can be used for risk-evaluation 
of citizens. hese evaluations can be sold, for example to inancial institutions to 
support decisions for awarding loans (O’Neil 2016), to health insurance companies 
to determine insurance premiums, to employers’ associations to inform decisions 
regarding employment (such as salary and working hours), or to predict ex-crim-
inals’ reofending rates. Most importantly of all, political decisions and knowledge 
of political opinions, which can be revealed easily, could, depending on the type of 
state, be misused. Geomedia therefore raise questions of “inclusion and exclusion, 
empowerment and exploitation, justice and injustice, equality and inequality” as 
5 Whitepaper from Pitney Bowes on „Location Intelligence: he New Geography of Business“: 
http://media.govtech.net/RC_PITNEYBOWES/BusinessWeek.pdf
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the “’empowering’ potentials of mobile connectivity might be hampered by existent 
power structures that determine what technology is being used, when, where, how 
and by whom” (Fast et al. 2018). 
Geomedia privacy
Concepts of privacy that clearly distinguish between the private (associated with 
family, private households, intimacy) and the public sphere (communicative networks 
to foster the formation of public opinion), as found in ancient Greek literature (Ar-
istotle) and later in the works of Habermas (1962) or Arendt (1958), must be revised 
as these two spheres become blurred and distorted by processes of advanced geo-
digitalization. he extensive use of geomedia challenges these two-sphere-concepts. 
Individual spatial information (especially connected to a time stamp) is particularly 
sensitive with respect to the possible disclosure of personally identifying information 
(PII). Explained briely, geolocation data are “(1) distributed (occur across multiple 
devices, applications and services), (2) platform-independent (data low easily across 
platforms, services and devices) and (3) indiscriminate (involve potentially all individ-
uals)” (Leszczynski 2017, p. 237). In this context, the need for a new understanding of 
privacy is raised by the “commercialization of all things ‘geo’ [represented and fostered 
by the] ubiquity and ordinariness of locationally enabled devices, mapping platforms, 
spatial interfaces, geosocial applications and myriad location-based services in the 
spaces and practices of the everyday” (Leszczynski 2017, p. 235). 
While the historical and cultural notions of privacy vary widely and do not con-
sistently estimate privacy desirable6, we want to use it as a meaningful and valu-
able concept – as a major element of functioning democracies. Democracies "(or 
governance for the people by their elected representatives) innately value privacy 
because it promotes free development of the self, nonconformity, diversity of views, 
new ideas and opportunities to enjoy intimacy without unwanted scrutiny” (McStay 
2017, p. 15), against negative accounts of privacy, based on seclusion and hiding, we 
want to condense it as autonomy, self-determination, voluntariness, free choice and 
responsibility for these choices (McStay 2017, p. 20). his follows Kant’s understanding 
of these conditions, together with freedom being the basis of a social and moral life 
(Kant 1996). Based on Kant’s notions of privacy, Fried (1970) characterizes privacy 
as the necessary condition for love, friendship and trust that “allows one the free-
dom to deine one’s relations with others and to deine oneself. In this way, privacy 
is also closely connected with respect and self-respect” (DeCew 2018). Concerning 
digital network technologies, we also make privacy-decisions on behalf of others 
(p.e. sharing pictures and information about others or tagging a person). herefore, 
6 For details see McStay (2017, pp. 11–24)
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privacy has a collective character that is based on interactions with others (McStay 
2017, p. 21). As Nissenbaum (2010) points out, privacy is more than the control of 
how much about ourselves we reveal to others, as stated by (Westin 1984). Moreover, 
the privacy and identity management strategies are dependent on contextual aspects. 
he normative concept of contextual integrity proposed by Nissenbaum (2010) looks 
at various information processes in various contexts. In an economic framework, 
a violation of privacy is caused diferently in friendship-like relationships than in 
professional ones. “Given the power of companies in the capitalist economy, economic 
privacy needs to be contextualized in a way that protects consumers and workers 
from capitalist control and at the same time makes corporate interests and corporate 
power transparent” (Fuchs 2011, p. 232). From the perspective of the individual, the 
right to privacy “is neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to the 
appropriate low of personal information” (Nissenbaum 2010, p. 127), and what is 
seen as appropriate is a normative distinction that involves the intersection of three 
aspects: actors, realm/space and information. When these norms are contravened, 
we experience a violation of privacy, here labelled a “violation of contextual integrity” 
(Nissenbaum 2010, p. 127). “At the level of politics, this requires governments to treat 
people with respect and dignity […]. he importance of liberal philosophy becomes 
clearer when we recognise that this holds sway over comprehension of human rights 
and the ethics that drive western law” (McStay 2017, p. 20). From a legal perspective, 
there are two diferent aspects (Zwick, Dholakia, 2001): 
1) Privacy as a basic human need, and as a civil and human right (Debatin 2011), 
vs. privacy as a commodity or private property (discussed from a critical angle by 
(Fuchs 2011)); 
2) privacy regulation by Government vs. Self-regulation. 
Diferent countries have developed diferent strategies. Whereas the EU legislation 
deines privacy as a basic human right and has established stronger legal regulation, in 
the US, privacy is equal to private property and seen as a commodity (Zwick, Dholakia 
2001, p. 120). Companies with a transnational reach challenge these two concepts, 
and the eicacy of the recent attempt by the EU to reinforce legal regulation through 
the GDPR has still to be proved. 
Self-disclosure, hidden data-sharing processes and privacy management
On the individual level, strategies for managing privacy and identity, according to 
Zwick and Dholakia (2004), are dependent on the accuracy and amount of personal 
Information revealed. 
his model (Figure 1) gives the impression that the amount and accuracy of per-
sonal information is visible, controllable and manageable by the users themselves. It 
doesn’t consider the hidden layers of the data-sharing processes.
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With reference to social networking sites, Debatin (2011) identiies several privacy 
risks that users agree to when posting on sites, and plots them in two dimensions: 
a horizontal axis for social interaction among users (including cyberstalking, ha-
rassment, reputation damage, but also representation through proiles), exempliied 
metaphorically as the visible tip of the iceberg, and a vertical axis for data collected 
(systematic collection, aggregation and use of data by the networking company, data 
miners and government agencies, third-party tracking and monitoring), represented 
by the much larger submerged, invisible part of the iceberg (Debatin 2011, p. 4). Sever-
al other authors have investigated that many users are not even aware of the excessive 
data-sharing processes and pervasive monitoring of online and mobile platforms 
(Christensen 2014; Christensen, Jansson 2015). 
here are numerous studies concerning the role of knowledge of data-sharing 
processes, privacy concerns and self-disclosure. boyd (2014) and Marwick and boyd 
(2014) showed that teenagers do not act carelessly on public networked spaces, but 
they cannot, despite privacy strategies, suiciently control the information lows, an 
outcome that reveals how their technical skills are inadequate for the protection of 
privacy. A study on Facebook and other social network sites conducted by Acquisti 
and Gross (2006, p. 21) documented signiicant dichotomies between speciic pri-
vacy concerns and actual information-revelation behavior. Although this study only 
examines student behavior, it provides evidence for the “privacy paradox” (Barnes 
2006). Several other studies have demonstrated the existence of this paradox, lagging 
a gap between privacy concerns and action (for an overview see Dienlin and Trepte 
(2014, p. 294)), and a few studies indicate privacy paradoxes that can be explained to 
a certain degree (Debatin et al. 2009). 
Fig. 1: Four tactics of privacy and identity management (Zwick, Dholakia 2004)
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An in-depth social-psychological analysis of privacy attitudes and privacy behavior 
by Dienlin and Trepte (2014) ofers a more complex picture. hey distinguish between 
privacy concerns and privacy attitudes, and diferentiate various privacy dimensions 
(informational, social and psychological), showing that “privacy behaviors are not 
paradoxical in nature but […] based on distinct privacy attitudes” (Dienlin & Trepte 
2014, p. 295).
To bring the discussion back to everyday geomedia practices that are “charac-
terised by extensive, real-time geosurveillance and the networked data and device 
ecologies” (Leszczynski 2017, p. 242), the link between privacy concerns (including 
knowledge on data-sharing processes and of the underlying commercial logic) and 
behavior cannot be described in a straightforward fashion. Quite the contrary: the 
contexts of data-sharing processes, economics and socio-technical transformation 
processes as well as the user’s sociodemographic status all inluence the appropriation 
of geomedia. he aim of this study was to investigate the speciic roles of geomedia 
within this complex ield. 
Approach
In the irst part of the paper we laid out the multifaceted nature of geomedia 
privacy management. It is with this aim in view that we posed the following research 
questions:
1. What kinds of traic and metadata are shared unwittingly if the smartphone is 
connected to a WiFi spot?
a. Of these, which are georeferenced?
b. What are the speciic contexts in which people would normally share or 
refuse to share these data?
here are diferent types of geodata (absolute location, relative location, (un)struc-
tured geodata) (Abernathy, 2017) that are received/gathered diferently. Most com-
monly the receiving/gathering is carried out via an A-GPS – a GPS sensor assisted 
by WiFi positioning aand the triangulation of mobile radio cells, or it comes as data 
that is shared as part of the Exif data. Sharing (by the user with third parties) takes 
place actively (for example via WhatsApp, or by giving certain apps location access), 
or inadvertently (by having switched on location access, so Google’s location API 
extracts information in the background on a continuous basis to push geo-targeted 
content – known as “geofencing” (Barreneche, Wilken 2015)).
As far as possible, we tried to determine the “precise nature” of this sharing of 
geodata. 
1. How much do individuals know about data-sharing processes and the under-
lying commercial logic?
2. How do people act in light of this knowledge?
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Our hypotheses were as follow:
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
he majority of people do care about the protection and control of geolocation 
data lows (even if in a loose and generally imprecise manner), but nevertheless share 
data using geomedia.
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
he amount and precise nature of the geodata shared depends on contextual factors.
We tested the following contexts and reasons for using geomedia and sharing 
geodata despite privacy concerns:
•	 Peer	pressure
•	 Work	pressure
•	 Fear	of	missing	out
•	 Lack	of	knowledge	
•	 "Careless"	use	(because	“everybody	uses	the	technology”;	because	of	“not	having	
anything to hide”)
•	 Trade-of:	convenience	(service)	vs.	tracing
Hypothesis 3 (H3):
he majority of people are aware of commercial data-sharing processes behind 
geomedia use, but not of their full extent.
Methods
he entire study was carried out in the context of the Austrian “Long Night of 
Research” (“Lange Nacht der Forschung”) at the University of Salzburg on 13 April 
2018, during which our project maintained a stand informing interested people about 
geolocation data-sharing processes. 
Using a combination of online questionnaire and quasi-experimental design (due 
to the lack of a control group / comparison group) (Bailey, 1994, p. 236), we exam-
ined people’s knowledge concerning how their geolocation data is shared, wittingly 
or unwittingly, enquired about their day-to-day behavior regarding shared data, and 
examined their concepts of privacy. he particular nature of this project was, irstly, 
that it has a clear educational and informative aim, and that, secondly, it is used to 
foster academic knowledge.
he whole study was pre-tested in a university context. According to the indings of 
the pretest, questionnaire and quasi-experimental setup were improved in an iterative 
process. he procedure itself began with welcoming the visitors, typically families and 
groups of friends and/or students. In order to achieve maximum anonymity, no per-
sonal details were taken without consent, and the utmost care was taken to eliminate 
personally identifying information (PII). he participants were divided into groups 
of 2–6 people to guarantee anonymity, and led through the whole quasi-experimental 
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process. In the irst step, they were asked to connect their smartphones to a randomly 
generated SSID (service set identiier) and were given a twelve digit passcode and 
a randomly generated four-digit Visitor ID. were given a four-digit passcode, which 
in turn randomly generated a Visitor ID. As soon as all the smartphones of a group 
were connected to our WiFi research device (to capture meta and traic data), the 
participants were asked to take a selie and to "share" (i.e. upload) it to a web service 
(operated by us). With this step, we were able to demonstrate the richness of the me-
ta-information (metadata) included as Exif (Exchangeable Image File Format), such 
as GNSS-coordinates, type of mobile device, and manufacturer speciications, that are 
shared when a photo is uploaded onto a platform. he next task was for participants 
to use their devices to search for the nearest Italian restaurant. his search allowed 
the collection of the domains the smartphones targeted (both the visible and invisible 
ones from a users’ perspective) and data about the search engine, navigation tool or 
browser being used. 
At the end of their visit, each participant received information about the amount 
of data sent to/received from the various platforms during their stay, which was pre-
sented statistically (i.e. visualized) in the form of various diagrams intended to help 
motivate them to reconsider their default settings, apps and internet usage. he visitors 
were then asked whether they would support our research further by completing an 
online questionnaire (see appendix).
he quasi-experimental setup provided people with evidence that their personal 
data could be tracked easily by third parties, while the online questionnaire collected 
data regarding behavior, contexts and awareness of data-sharing processes. Visitors 
who were willing to participate were required to sign an agreement that their data 
would be kept and linked to the VisitorID. If they declined, the linkage between Visitor 
ID and recorded data was deleted.
Several limitations to the current study should be pointed out. First, the data was 
captured using a quasi-experimental design and cannot therefore be evaluated against 
a control group. he behavior captured only shows tendencies in an artiicial context 
(“he Long Night of Research”), which may have encouraged people to give away 
data more freely. As the study was carried out in the context of a particular event, it 
cannot be repeated.
Second, the results of the questionnaire rely on interpretations of assumed be-
havior based on the respondents’ self-reports: their actual day-to-day actions could 
not be monitored in this setup. We should also point out that answers regarding the 
importance of privacy may have been given in what was perceived to be a socially 
desirable way.
Finally, participation in our study was self-selecting and voluntary, and resulted 
in a voluntary sample with an unpredictable “n” (number of participants). Visitors 
to “he Long Night of Research” may in general be more highly educated, and more 
interested and critical than the average citizen.
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Results 
Quantitative online survey
he online survey respondents (n= 102) were predominantly female (73.8%); 
46.1% had a higher school certiicate or held a university degree (32.4%). he mean 
age of participants was 29.38 (percentiles: 25 => 21 years; 75 => 32 years). For the 
general question of app-usage behavior, we would like to draw attention to the fol-
lowing points (from Figure 2): 88.2% said they used Google maps; 96.7% of this 
group gave their reason as inding it useful, whereas 60% of the non-users did not 
use it for privacy protection reasons. he second most frequently used type of app 
were “apps for public transport” (83.3%), followed by social network apps (78.4%). 
he most common reasons for using social network apps were “to stay informed” 
(65%), “because friends use them” (63.8%) and “usefulness” (56.3%). Only 7.8% of 
the respondents said that they used dating apps.
Reasons for usage (multiple choice)
Reasons for non-use 
(multiple choice)
Use 
(%) 
Useful Work
Stay in-
formed
Fear 
of 
miss-
ing 
out
Be-
cause 
Friends 
use
Because 
Family 
use
Don’t 
use 
(%)
Not 
in-
ter-
ested
Don’t 
know 
apps
Privacy 
pro-
tection 
reasons
Sightseeing 
apps
39.2 87.5 7.5 27.5 - 7.5 5.0 60.8 54.8 51.6 21.0
Public 
transport 
apps
83.3 92.9 12.9 28.2 - 4.7 3.5 15.7 37.5 50.0 18.8
Weather 
apps
68.6 85.7 10.0 50.0 - 1.4 2.9 30.4 87.1 9.7 12.9
Google 
Maps
88.2 96.7 16.7 - - 5.6 4.4 9.8 60 20 60
apple 
"Maps"
19.6 95.0 10.0 - - 0.0 0.0 78.4 37.5 61.3 3.8
Social 
Network 
apps
78.4 56.3 12.5 65.0 22.5 63.8 30.0 19.6 55.0 20.0 55.0
Shopping 
apps
26.5 100.0 3.7 22.2 0.0 3.7 3.7 70.6 91.7 6.9 13.9
Fitness apps 31.4 90.6 0.0 6.3 0.0 3.1 3.1 64.7 84.8 9.1 21.2
Dating apps 7.8 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 88.2 92.2 8.9 13.3
Delivery 
service apps
22.5 100.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 4.3 4.3 73.5 88.0 13.3 8.0
Fig. 2: digital application usage patterns
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On a scale of 1 (fully agree) to 5 (completely disagree), 44.9% of respondents chose 
1 or 2, meaning that they didn’t feel able to protect their user-data from being shared 
and used.
Hypothesis tests
H1 predicted that the majority of people cared about the protection and control of 
geolocation data lows, but nevertheless shared data using geomedia. he hypothesis 
was tested by calculating an index for “care about the protection and control of geoloca-
tion data lows” and one for “share data using geomedia”. his hypothesis was partially 
supported. A weak to moderate correlation between the two indices occurred (p=0.13; 
r0.268), though the hypothesis ("people would care about data protection but despite 
shared geodata") had no signiicant result (p=0.161) within the given sample (58%). We 
can state that the more people care about data protection and control of geolocation 
data lows, the less they share data using geomedia. 45% of the respondents said that 
they took measures to protect their privacy on the internet. Of this group, 93.5% said 
that they intentionally changed the privacy settings on certain apps and made full use 
of “opt-out” options. 65.2% said that they never used certain apps/platforms for privacy 
reasons. 26.1% used an encrypted email service. Only 17.4% used a search engine that 
did not track search behavior. 50% stated that the locating function on their smart-
phone was generally disabled. 48% stated that they disabled location access for their 
smartphone camera, whereas 27.5% stated that their smartphone camera was amongst 
those services that had permanent access to their location (18.6% didn’t know about 
their settings). 25.5% said that they usually shared their location history with Google 
or Apple, 52.9% that they did not, and 15.7% did not know. 
H2 predicted that the amount and precise nature of the geodata shared depend-
ed on contextual factors. Location is shared diferently in diferent contexts. 22.5% 
generally shared their location with family and friends; 20.2% shared it with family, 
friends and partners when they were travelling; and 52.8% responded that they did 
not share their location in any of the given situations. 
Yes (%)
I normally share my location with my family/partner so that they know exactly who is 
where.
22.5
I usually share my location with friends (e.g. to arrange an exact meeting place) 19.1
When sharing pictures, I usually share my location intentionally (using GPS) 19.1
Within my professional network, I am required to share my current location 1.1
I share my location with my family/friends/partner when I’m away travelling 20.2
I share my current routes and performance when doing sports (e.g. running, hiking, etc.) 12.4
In none of the given situations 52.8
Fig. 3: “contextual factors” (multiple choice)
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he hypothesis was tested for each app category separately (sightseeing, public 
transport, weather, Google Maps, Apple “maps”, social networking, shopping, itness, 
dating) with the contextual (and motivational) usage pattern: 
Usefulness, χ2(9) = 83.015, p < 0.001
Work, χ2(9) = 13.815, p < 0.129
Relevant information/stay informed, χ2(7) = 67.556, p < 0.001
Fear of missing out, χ2(4) = 22.515, p < 0.001
Friends use it, χ2(9) = 191.333, p < 0.001
Family use it, χ2(9) = 63.895, p < 0.001
he result is statistically signiicant. Although 52.8% of participants answered that 
they shared their location in “none of the given situations”, motivation and precise 
context matter in app-usage behavior. 
H3 predicted that the majority of people were aware of commercial data-sharing 
processes behind geomedia use, but not their full extent. he hypothesis was tested 
by calculating an index for the “awareness of commercial data-sharing processes”. 
his index was then tested against the threshold for “not to their full extent”. he 
hypothesis was falsiied because 50% of the people were aware of the full extent of 
commercial data-sharing processes.
The Quasi-experiment
A total of 79 people participated in our quasi-experiment (79 smartphones connect-
ed to our research web service). 69 of the participants managed to upload a selie, so 
we were able to analyze the Exif metadata. It was possible to extract the location (GPS 
data) from only 11 of these, but we were able to extract information about the most 
frequently used smartphone brands, current versions of running operating systems and 
browsers used. In total 1.12 GB were uploaded. In the course of the whole experiment, 
the participants’ smartphones made 3,916 valid domain name queries without their 
owners knowing it. he ive most frequent (unwittingly) opened domains were www.
google.com (359 hits), connectivitycheck.gstatic.com (82 hits), www.google.at (78 hits), 
android.clients.google.com (56 hits), and play.googleapis.com (53 hits). Google APIs 
(application programming interfaces) are google analytics tools that run invisibly (for 
the user) and reveal website-usage statistics to google and its ailiates. Considering the 
second-level domains only, the ranking was as follows: google.com (713 hits), apple.com 
(367 hits), googleapis.com (311 hits each), gstatic.com (217 hits), google.at (138 hits), 
googleuser-content.com (123 hits) and icloud.com (108 hits).
he information about the massive amount of data that is shared by a smart-
phone, as soon as it is connected to WiFi, while users are entangled in everyday 
geomedia usage, was presented to the participants visually in the form of various 
diagrams and should help motivate them to reconsider their default settings, apps 
and internet usage.
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Discussion /Conclusion
he results of the online questionnaire indicated that there was a weak to moderate 
correlation between the indices “care about protection and control of geolocation data 
lows” and “share of data using geomedia” (with a statistically non-signiicant result). 
herefore, the hypothesis that people care about privacy but nevertheless share data 
using geomedia could not be supported. We did not ind a dichotomy between caring 
about data protection and usage behavior. 45% of the respondents said that they took 
measures to protect their privacy on the internet. Of this group, 93.5% stated that they 
deliberately change the privacy settings on certain apps. From the results of the quasi 
experiment, however, we could visualize the massive amount of data that is shared 
by a smartphone as soon as it is connected to WiFi, while users perform “simple” 
search queries or share a selie and do not realize the hidden data-sharing processes. 
We agree with and emphasize Debatin’s theory of a submerged part of network be-
havior. While the visible part (1/8 of the whole) (Debatin et al., 2009, p. 88) is seen as 
social networking and fun from the users’ perspective (in our study the fun element 
is complemented by the assumed usefulness of apps), the invisible part (7/8 of the 
whole) (ibid.) is “constantly fed by the data that trickle down from the interactions 
and self-descriptions of the users in the visible part” (Debatin et al., 2009, p. 88).
According to our results, users do try to protect their privacy, but only manage 
to do so within what is visibly accessible to them (by changing the privacy settings, 
holding back certain contents, etc.). he hidden part of the data-sharing processes 
is non-transparent and uncontrollable. Participants said they had a vague idea of 
the hidden data-sharing processes but were shocked by how much our quasi-ex-
periment revealed. his casts new light on the privacy paradox insofar as we have 
to consider the virtual impossibility of fully controlling data mining and marketing, 
aggregation, iltering and re-organization of data for purposes of targeted marketing 
and risk-evaluation. It seems that only the non-use of geomedia or the strict use 
of geomedia that resist the trend can one protect one’s privacy: the AP (Associated 
Press) reported in August 2018 that Google saves your location history even if you 
have paused “location history” on your mobile device.7 But the non-use of geome-
dia is not the kind of usage pattern we observed. Amongst the participants, Google 
Maps is the most frequently used app and the number-one tool for navigation, being 
used by 88.2%. 96.7% of these users utilize it for practical reasons, while 60% of the 
non-users don’t use it because of privacy concerns. If we connect these indings with 
the outcome of the data collected by our research web service, we can demonstrate 
the enormous role that Google plays. Google can clearly be identiied as one of the 
dominant players of the actual transformation of everyday life as Google services were 
the top ive second-level domains to mutually exchange information. As geomedia are 
7 https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb
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“contextualizing communication“ (Gryl, Jekel 2012, p. 22), regulating “social behavior 
and interpersonal communications” (Lapenta 2011) and changing the appropriation 
of space, the dominance of one big player is to be criticized as it leads to restricted 
diversity in favor of (Google’s own) commercial beneits.
Participants in our study showed a high degree of awareness of the commercial aims 
behind data-sharing processes; 50% of them were even aware of the full extent of these 
aims (all items selected). We may argue that general awareness of problems with data 
collection as part of business models has increased recently due to the GDPR, which 
came into force on 25 May 2018, and the controversy around Cambridge Analytica. he 
case of Cambridge Analytica, a company that provided targeted marketing services to 
corporate but also political clients, and used Facebook data to inluence the 2016 U.S. 
election, points to the political dimensions of media practices and data-sharing processes.
It could be argued that our study was self-selecting and voluntary, and that the 
visitors to “he Long Night of Research” were in general highly educated and more 
aware of the problems with data-sharing processes. his argument is supported by 
the fact that 46.1% of the participants had a higher school certiicate, and 32.4% held 
a university degree. Furthermore, one could argue that only people with a certain crit-
ical approach to privacy came to our research corner. We think that these arguments 
are relected in the online questionnaire, but despite our participants having a raised 
problem awareness, they were still not capable of controlling the hidden data-sharing 
processes. With this in mind, it can be stated that there is a gap between the ability to 
determine an appropriate low of geodata and the actual low of data, which is shaped 
by the platforms business-models and privacy policies. his gap could be seen as an 
expression of power imbalances between corporations and users.
Examining the geodata shared in diferent contexts, we discovered that contextual 
factors matter: the contextual usage patterns within the app categories vary signiicantly. 
Although the majority of people (52.8%) preferred not to share their location in any 
of the given situations, they did in some cases share a lot of information inadvertently. 
Depending on contextual factors, people accepted a trade-of between an intrusion 
into privacy and convenience. Participants were most likely to share their location with 
their family/partner (22.5%) and when away (20.2%). he contextual privacy approach 
(Nissenbaum, 2010) can be applied to geomedia and geolocation data. 
GDPR may have inluenced the outcome of our study as well, on the one hand by 
a raised general awareness of privacy as a basic human right, and on the other in a tech-
nical way. We found that although the smartphone camera was enabled to access the 
current location, the GPS data was not included in the Exif (which would normally be 
the case). Only older (non-updated) versions of sotware provided GPS location when 
the camera was location-enabled. It appears that recent sotware updates now restrict 
locational data lows.
Information about the smartphone brands, and therefore of the operating systems 
running and browsers used, and consequently diferences in data shared, reveals the 
“socio-material relations” (Jansson, 2018) of smartphone usage patterns. 
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he relation between awareness of shared geolocation data, the usefulness of apps, 
the data-sharing processes that result in inadvertent sharing, and subsequent actions 
are complex. We hope that more research will be done to shed light on these com-
plexities. Due to the limitations of our study, we suggest further, more generalizable, 
investigation of the ield of (un)wittingly-shared geolocation data in the framework 
of economics (geomedia business models). Any recommendation for further action 
to advance privacy-protection mechanisms should be based on three pillars (Debatin 
2011): legal regulation, ethical self-regulation (Steinmaurer & Atteneder, 2018), and 
privacy-enhancing technology.
We may ask whether technological design (or privacy-by-design) could foster 
privacy capabilities among geomedia users and whether GDPR, despite all the criti-
cism of it, is an important step to regulate data lows. Ethical self-regulation can range 
from unconsidered and full adoption of geomedia to an absolute refusal to use them. 
Shaping the world where we live in geomedia requires not only technical knowledge, 
but also raised awareness and educational eforts in universities and schools, and for 
company employees.
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Appendix 1 – Questionnaire
Dear Participants,
hank you for supporting our research! In the context of the Austrian “Long Night of Research” 
at the University of Salzburg, we are conducting research on data-sharing processes. […]8
1. Do you use sightseeing apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
2. Do you use apps for public transport?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
8 Note: original questionnaire was in German with a longer foreword!
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i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
3. Do you use weather apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kind of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
4. Do you use Google Maps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
5. Do you use apple “Maps”?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
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i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
6. Do you use social network apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
7. Do you use shopping apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
8. Do you use itness apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
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i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
9. Do you use dating apps?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my data)
10. Do you use apps for delivery services (food, etc.)?
a. Yes
i. For what reasons do you use these apps?
1. Because I ind them useful
2. I use them for my work
3. To get relevant information and to stay informed
4. Because otherwise I’m afraid of missing something 
5. Because some/most of my friends use these apps
6. Because some/most of my family members use these apps
b. No
i. For what reasons do you never use these apps?
1. I’m not interested in them
2. I don’t know these kinds of apps
3. For privacy reasons (I don’t want to share my Data)
11. Do you know how to share your location on your smartphone (positioning services)
a. Yes
b. No
12. In your opinion, which of the following apps uses user-data for commercial purposes?
Yes No
Sightseeing apps o o
apps for public transport o o
Weather apps o o
Google Maps o o
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Yes No
Apple „Maps“ o o
Social network apps o o
Shopping apps o o
Fitness apps o o
Dating apps o o
apps for delivery services o o
13. Do you usually share your location history with Google or Apple?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
14. Is the camera on your smartphone enabled to access your location?
a. Yes
b. No
c. I don’t know
15. Are there apps on your smartphone that you always prevent from accessing your location?
a. Yes
i. Which ones?
b. no
16. Which of the following apps do you allow to access to your location?
Yes No
Sightseeing apps o o
apps for public transport o o
Weather apps o o
Google Maps o o
apple „Maps“ o o
Social network apps o o
Shopping apps o o
Fitness apps o o
Dating apps o o
apps for delivery services o o
17. Please rate the following statements (Scale: 1= totally agree; 5= totally disagree)
a. It bothers me that my app-usage behaviour is traceable
b. I don’t care much about the usage of my data online
c. It bothers me that my user-data is shared with “third parties”
d. In general, I am fairly concerned about data protection and privacy on the 
internet
e. I don’t feel capable of protecting my data online
f. I don’t have time to be bothered about the topic of privacy
g. I don’t have the time to deal with that topic
18. In which of the following situations do you share your location (multiple choice)?
a. Normally, I share my location with my family/my partner so that they know 
exactly who is where.
b. I usually share my location with friends (e.g. to arrange an exact meeting place)
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c. When sharing pictures, I usually share my location consciously (GPS)
d. Within my professional network, I have to share my current location
e. I share my location with my family/my friends/my partner when I’m away 
f. I share my current routes and performance when doing sports
g. In none of the given situations
19. Did you participate in the experiment at the “Long Night of Science 2018”?
a. Yes
i. Before the experiment, were you aware of sharing data with (hidden) domains when 
doing a simple search query?
1. Yes
2. No
b. No
20. Do you actively protect your personal data on the internet?
a. Yes
i. Which of the following measures do you take?
1. I consciously change the privacy settings of certain apps
2. I refuse to use certain apps/platforms for privacy reasons
3. I use an encrypted E-Mail service
4. I use a search engine that doesn’t track my search behaviour
5. Location services are generally disabled on my smartphone
b. No
21. Finally, please provide us with some information about yourself:
22. How old are you? ___________
23. What is your highest level of successfully completed education?
24. Are you male/female?
25. Could we contact you for a further in-depth qualitative interview?
a. Yes
i. Please leave your contact information:
b. No
hank you for participating!
Appendix 2 – Number of hits for second-level domains (hits per domain)
713 google.com.
367 apple.com.
311 googleapis.com.
217 gstatic.com.
138 google.at.
123 googleusercontent.com.
108 icloud.com.
98 facebook.com.
86 ac.at.
74 doubleclick.net.
62 whatsapp.net.
48 apple-dns.net.
44 ampproject.org.
43 googleadservices.com.
36 samsung.com.
35 orf.at.
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28 akamaiedge.net.
27 google-analytics.com.
26 android.com.
25 crashlytics.com.
22 zeit.de.
22 googletagmanager.com.
21 oewabox.at.
21 instagram.com.
21 glpals.com.
21 bcdn.net.
20 samqaicongen.com.
19 youtube.com.
16 yahoo.com.
16 googlesyndication.com.
16 cloudfront.net.
15 amazonaws.com.
12 twitter.com.
12 samsungapps.com.
12 bing.com.
12 adnxs.com.
11 digicert.com.
11 avast.com.
11 akadns.net.
10 yimg.com.
10 samsungcloud.com.
10 ntp.org.
10 meetrics.net.
10 letsencrypt.org.
10 gvt1.com.
10 google.de.
9 ksmobile.net.
9 hicloud.com.
9 googlezip.net.
9 gmx.net.
9 game-mode.net.
9 amazonvideo.com.
8 skype.com.
8 microsot.com.
8 ligatus.com.
8 googletagservices.com.
8 gmail.com.
8 cmcm.com.
7 spotify.com.
7 ksmobile.com.
7 b.com.
7 facebook.net.
7 demdex.net.
7 cdninstagram.com.
7 appslyer.com.
7 adjust.com.
7 1und1.de.
6 weather.com.
6 twimg.com.
6 snapchat.com.
6 secb2b.com.
6 samsungpositioning.com.
6 outlook.com.
6 mozilla.com.
6 moatads.com.
6 ioam.de.
6 identrust.com.
6 gvt3.com.
6 gvt2.com.
6 app-measurement.com.
6 applovin.com.
6 amazon.com.
6 accuweather.com.
6 aaplimg.com.
5 zeitverlag.de.
5 wp.com.
5 ui-portal.de.
5 intercom.io.
5 ggpht.com.
5 gebrauchtwagen.at.
5 gdatasecurity.de.
5 cloudlare.com.
5 adition.com.
5 adform.net.
5 a1.net.
5 3gppnetwork.org.
4 ytimg.com.
4 tclclouds.com.
4 spaghettiundco.com.
4 solarmovie.ph.
4 scorecardresearch.com.
4 rihub.com.
4 qualtrics.com.
4 pinterest.com.
4 outbrain.com.
4 opera.com.
4 msn.com.
4 mozilla.net.
4 mixpanel.com.
4 lijit.com.
4 lastella-salzburg.at.
4 krone.at.
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4 exactag.com.
4 eset.com.
4 apester.com.
4 addthis.com.
3 zeropc.com.
3 whatsapp.com.
3 uicdn.com.
3 t.co.
3 tapad.com.
3 ssl-images-amazon.com.
3 sfx.ms.
3 samsungosp.com.
3 rubiconproject.com.
3 peel-prod.com.
3 netdoktor.de.
3 mxcdn.net.
3 mopub.com.
3 mathtag.com.
3 iocnt.net.
3 htcsense.com.
3 htc.com.
3 duckduckgo.com.
3 dsp.io.
3 disqus.com.
3 diepresse.com.
3 combotag.com.
3 casalemedia.com.
3 bidswitch.net.
3 avcdn.net.
3 amazon-adsystem.com.
3 agkn.com.
3 advertising.com.
3 adsafeprotected.com.
3 adkmob.com.
3 accountkit.com.
2 zendesk.com.
2 zeitakademie.de.
2 zdbb.net.
2 xing.com.
2 w.org.
2 wordpress.com.
2 woman.at.
2 willhaben.at.
2 web.de.
2 vi-serve.com.
2 vimeo.com.
2 vimeocdn.com.
2 viber.com.
2 upalytics.com.
2 uimserv.net.
2 typekit.net.
2 twitch.tv.
2 twiago.com.
2 tunein.com.
2 tumblr.com.
2 theadex.com.
2 telering.at.
2 symcd.com.
2 styria-digital.com.
2 studo.co.
2 stickyadstv.com.
2 staticiles.at.
2 scrm.com.
2 sascdn.com.
2 samsungdm.com.
2 samsung.de.
2 salzburg24.at.
2 pushwoosh.com.
2 primevideo.com.
2 powerlinks.com.
2 plista.com.
2 pinimg.com.
2 paypal.com.
2 ospserver.net.
2 optmstr.com.
2 openx.net.
2 onelink.me.
2 omtrdc.net.
2 netmng.com.
2 netlix.com.
2 myqnapcloud.com.
2 musical.ly.
2 mozilla.org.
2 mgccw.com.
2 mcdonalds.at.
2 maps.me.
2 mail.ru.
2 linkedin.com.
2 ligadx.com.
2 launchdarkly.com.
2 krxd.net.
2 isnssdk.com.
2 ip-api.com.
2 interestingprizesforyou.stream.
2 icloud-content.com.
2 hshh.org.
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2 h-bid.com.
2 gwallet.com.
2 google.it.
2 fqtag.com.
2 lipboard.com.
2 exelator.com.
2 ebay.com.
2 disquscdn.com.
2 ctnsnet.com.
2 crwdcntrl.net.
2 criteo.com.
2 co.uk.
2 chip.de.
2 blogspot.com.
2 beusable.net.
2 avaaz.org.
2 app.link.
2 aniview.com.
2 amazon.de.
2 akamai.net.
2 agoda.com.
2 adworx.at.
2 adsrvr.org.
2 adobe.com.
2 2mdn.net.
1 zooverresources.com.
1 zoover.nl.
1 zifdavis.com.
1 zhiliaoapp.com.
1 ze.tt.
1 zeit-verlagsgruppe.de.
1 zeit-verlag.de.
1 zeitabo.de.
1 yieldmo.com.
1 yieldlab.net.
1 yesss.at.
1 yahooapis.com.
1 yabidos.com.
1 wps.com.
1 wix.com.
1 wikipedia.org.
1 whispersystems.org.
1 weltkunst.de.
1 weborama.fr.
1 wbtrk.net.
1 was-tuat-si.at.
1 w55c.net.
1 vtracy.de.
1 vk.com.
1 visualdna.com.
1 veruta.com.
1 userreport.com.
1 ursulinen-salzburg.at.
1 unsplash.com.
1 uni-salzburg.at.
1 umfrageonline.com.
1 uefa.com.
1 ubimet.com.
1 twyn.com.
1 turn.com.
1 ttvnw.net.
1 trustx.org.
1 truste.com.
1 trustarc.com.
1 tiqcdn.com.
1 tibs.net.
1 thunderhead.com.
1 styria-publishing.com.
1 statcounter.com.
1 spotxchange.com.
1 spektrum.de.
1 speedtest.net.
1 spar.at.
1 solarmovie.so.
1 smartstream.tv.
1 sitescout.com.
1 siteimprove.com.
1 siteimproveanalytics.com.
1 simpli.i.
1 sharethrough.com.
1 serving-sys.com.
1 semasio.net.
1 seadform.net.
1 salzburgresearch.at.
1 salzburg-altstadt.at.
1 rvs.at.
1 rutarget.ru.
1 runtastic.com.
1 roteskreuz.at.
1 rlcdn.com.
1 revolutionevent.com.
1 realmadrid.es.
1 rayjump.com.
1 quatscha.at.
1 quantcount.com.
1 qq.com.
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1 pubmatic.com.
1 polyill.io.
1 pizzeria-daciro.at.
1 pizzamann.at.
1 pesthaus.at.
1 osteria-cavalli.at.
1 opera.sotware.
1 opera-api.com.
1 onesignal.com.
1 onaudience.com.
1 oice365.com.
1 oebb.at.
1 obvsg.at.
1 ntracecloud.com.
1 nr-data.net.
1 nmapps.de.
1 nict.jp.
1 nexage.com.
1 nexac.com.
1 newrelic.com.
1 ndimg.de.
1 narando.com.
1 my-samsung.com.
1 myfonts.net.
1 mstrlytcs.com.
1 mobpalm.com.
1 mobimagic.com.
1 mobile.de.
1 ml314.com.
1 mjam.net.
1 mindtake.com.
1 mindbreeze.com.
1 microsotonline-p.com.
1 microsotonline.com.
1 mein-fussabdruck.at.
1 mediatek.com.
1 media.net.
1 media-amazon.com.
1 media6degrees.com.
1 me.com.
1 mcafee.com.
1 lqm.io.
1 lqmcdn.com.
1 liverpoolfc.tv.
1 live.net.
1 linguatec.org.
1 ligaportal.at.
1 lidlplus.com.
1 liadm.com.
1 leanplum.com.
1 langenachtderforschung.at.
1 ksosot.com.
1 kleinezeitung.at.
1 kingsot-oice-service.com.
1 kingsot.com.
1 keytiles.com.
1 juliasellmann.com.
1 jsdelivr.net.
1 jquery.com.
1 jpush.cn.
1 ixiaa.com.
1 isappcloud.com.
1 irquest.com.
1 iroither.at.
1 iqm.de.
1 iqcontentplatform.de.
1 indivsurvey.de.
1 imrworldwide.com.
1 immowelt.de.
1 ib-ibi.com.
1 hs-data.com.
1 hotmail.com.
1 hothardware.com.
1 hotelmediaservice.com.
1 hello-october.com.
1 haui.eu.
1 harrycloudfoot.com.
1 gumgum.com.
1 gssprt.jp.
1 grm-pro.com.
1 gravatar.com.
1 googlevideo.com.
1 googlemail.com.
1 google.es.
1 goo.gl.
1 go-mpulse.net.
1 goetz-motorsport.de.
1 glotgrx.com.
1 getpebble.com.
1 gdatasotware.com.
1 g.cn.
1 fyber.com.
1 lickr.com.
1 inanzen.net.
1 fcbayern.com.
1 faistenau-online.at.
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1 eyereturn.com.
1 eyeota.net.
1 eyeem.com.
1 extremereach.io.
1 exlibrisgroup.com.
1 eurowings.com.
1 etsy.com.
1 eslgaming.com.
1 enuvo.ch.
1 entrust.net.
1 emetriq.de.
1 electriclove.at.
1 elba.at.
1 eingutertag.org.
1 e-fellows.net.
1 edgekey.net.
1 ebay-us.com.
1 ebayimg.com.
1 ebay.de.
1 dyntrk.com.
1 duapps.com.
1 dropbox.com.
1 drei.at.
1 dotomi.com.
1 direct.ly.
1 digitru.st.
1 derstandard.at.
1 dept1.de.
1 de.com.
1 dbankcdn.com.
1 datenschutz-grundverordnung.eu.
1 cxense.com.
1 cryptocompare.com.
1 classistatic.de.
1 calista.at.
1 btc-echo.de.
1 brandeins.de.
1 brandcrumb.com.
1 bnc.lt.
1 bluemailapp.com.
1 bluekai.com.
1 bitstrips.com.
1 bitmoji.com.
1 bidtheatre.com.
1 bidr.io.
1 bergbahnen-werfenweng.com.
1 bellevue-ferienhaus.de.
1 batmobi.net.
1 basebanner.com.
1 avg.com.
1 avazutracking.net.
1 avazunativeads.com.
1 autohaus-traunreut.de.
1 atdmt.com.
1 asroma.it.
1 ask.com.
1 asideas.de.
1 appspot.com.
1 appboy.com.
1 apa.at.
1 anrdoezrs.net.
1 anime-mura.de.
1 angsrvr.com.
1 amelialiana.com.
1 allunite.com.
1 alipay.com.
1 akstat.io.
1 akamaihd.net.
1 airbnb.com.
1 adzif.com.
1 adsymptotic.com.
1 adservice.at.
1 adscale.de.
1 adsafety.net.
1 adrtx.net.
1 adriver.ru.
1 adobedtm.com.
1 adingo.jp.
1 adhigh.net.
1 addthisedge.com.
1 active-agent.com.
1 accu-weather.com.
1 a1community.net.
1 3lit.com.
1 360yield.com.
1 360safe.com.
1 1rx.io.
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359 www.google.com.
83 universum.sbg.ac.at.
82 connectivitycheck.gstatic.com.
78 www.google.at.
56 android.clients.google.com.
53 play.googleapis.com.
50 www.googleapis.com.
47 clients4.google.com.
46 mtalk.google.com.
43 clients3.google.com.
43 www.googleadservices.com.
41 android.googleapis.com.
41 lh5.googleusercontent.com.
39 www.gstatic.com.
35 apple.com.
35 clients1.google.com.
34 adservice.google.at.
34 cdn.ampproject.org.
34 lh3.googleusercontent.com.
34 www.apple.com.
32 captive.apple.com.
32 graph.facebook.com.
31 googleads.g.doubleclick.net.
29 www.icloud.com.
28 g.whatsapp.net.
27 api-glb-fra.smoot.apple.com.
27 mmg-fna.whatsapp.net.
25 connectivitycheck.android.com.
23 accounts.google.com.
23 lh4.googleusercontent.com.
22 adservice.google.com.
22 coniguration.apple.com.
22 encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com.
22 lh6.googleusercontent.com.
22 www.googletagmanager.com.
21 maps.gstatic.com.
20 gs-loc.apple.com.
20 id.google.at.
20 maps.googleapis.com.
19 ad.doubleclick.net.
18 mesu.apple.com.
18 safebrowsing.googleapis.com.
18 settings.crashlytics.com.
18 translate.googleapis.com.
17 www.facebook.com.
16 fonts.gstatic.com.
16 mobilemaps-pa.googleapis.com.
16 www.google-analytics.com.
15 fonts.googleapis.com.
15 gateway.icloud.com.
14 clientservices.googleapis.com.
14 mqtt-mini.facebook.com.
12 cl2.apple.com.
12 e6858.dsce9.akamaiedge.net.
12 init.itunes.apple.com.
12 www.youtube.com.
11 gsp64-ssl.ls.apple.com.
11 ocsp.digicert.com.
11 ssl.google-analytics.com.
11 supl.google.com.
10 chromecontentsuggestions-pa.googleapis.
com.
10 edge-mqtt.facebook.com.
10 ocsp.int-x3.letsencrypt.org.
10 s.yimg.com.
10 www.bing.com.
9 gateway.fe.apple-dns.net.
9 gllto.glpals.com.
9 google.com.
9 graph.instagram.com.
9 guzzoni.apple.com.
9 mtalk4.google.com.
9 promo.webpayments.closeby.internet.apps.
samsung.com.
9 time-ios.apple.com.
9 update.googleapis.com.
9 vas.samsungapps.com.
8 api.samsungcloud.com.
8 datasaver.googleapis.com.
8 geomobileservices-pa.googleapis.com.
8 imap.gmail.com.
8 mobile.pipe.aria.microsot.com.
8 pagead2.googlesyndication.com.
8 service.game-mode.net.
8 setup.icloud.com.
8 ssl.gstatic.com.
8 stats.g.doubleclick.net.
8 www.googletagservices.com.
7 2.android.pool.ntp.org.
7 app.adjust.com.
7 at.search.yahoo.com.
7 connect.facebook.net.
Appendix 3 – Top 90 list of fully qualiied domain names (hits per domain)
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